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THE LAW OF THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT*

Charles O. Gregoryt
Wagner Act contained no law governing collective agreements. Congress left their enforcement to the state and federal courts under the miserable body of common-law rules.1 Under
various theories the courts worried about consideration, mutuality
of obligation, duress and public policy aspects as if they were dealing with conventional contracts.
Actually we do not have much of a body of law, as such,
governing collective agreements. Our chief concern has been
simply with their enforcement. We must assume that they are
legal, although it may be rash to assume that they are real contracts. They have aptly been called treaties and gentlemen's agreements. Justice Jackson said they were analogous to railroad tariffs,
standard insurance provisions, and utility rates, because they were
automatically reflected in individual contracts of employment/'
The Privy Council held a collective agreement to be enforceable
only by a strike.3 In this country we have said that only employees
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• An address delivered at an institute on Collective Bargaining and the Law, The
University of Michigan Law School, August I, 1958.-Ed.
tProfessor of Law, University of Virginia.-Ed.
1 The classical discussion of the common-law rules is in Rice, "Collective Labor
Agreements in American Law," 44 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 572 (1931). A fair idea of the utter
hopelessness of these common-law rules appears in Witmer, "Collective Labor Agreements
in the Courts," 48 YALE L. J. 195 (1938). See also the discussions in GREGORY AND KATZ,
LABOR LAW: CAsES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTS 1152-1163 (1948) and in GREGORY, LABOR
AND THE LAw, 2d rev. ed., 443 et seq. (1958). Two examples of faith in the evolutionary development of the old common-law system are Fuchs, "Collective Labor Agreements under
Administrative Regulation of Employment," 35 CoL. L. R.Ev. 493 (1935), and Lenhoff,
"The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System," 39 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 1109 (1941)-both brilliant and penetrating essays.
For a refreshing realism in this field, see the various articles ,by Professor Archibald
Cox of Harvard Law School: "Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts," 67 HARv. L.
R.Ev. 591 (1954); "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1956);
"Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration," 30 ROCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 247
(1958); and "The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements," 57 MICH. L. REv.
1 (1958).
2 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
3 Young v. Canadian N. Ry., [1931] A.C. 83.
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can sue to enforce provisions of collective agreements as terms in
their individual employment contracts. Occasionally, however,
unions have enforced rights secured to them directly, such as
union security or the check-off of union dues. But unions could
not maintain actions on behalf of employees, either large groups
or individuals.
The enforcement of provisions in collective agreements has
always been most unsatisfactory. An employee bringing suit had
to hire a lawyer, file pleadings, wait for trial, stand the chances of
an appeal and pay all expenses himself. Before final judgment the
agreement would have been replaced by others which might also
have expired. Indeed the bargaining agency itself might no longer
be the same. A master agreement might cover plants in several
states. Hence its provisions might receive as many different interpretations as there were state courts to pass on them, with resulting chaos.
In the Westinghouse case,4 a divided majority of Supreme
Court justices seemed to agree that section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act5 did not establish federal substantive law
to govern enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement,
at least as to the "uniquely personal rights" 6 of employees to compensation. Therefore, there was no basis for federal jurisdiction
over a union's suit to enforce the agreement in this respect, in the
absence of diversity of citizenship. But two years later in the
Lincoln Mills case7 a different majority of the Court held that
section 301 did give the federal courts jurisdiction to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate, upon a union's suit for specific performance. The basis for federal jurisdiction was in the federal law
which was to govern the case, arising under section 301 itself.

4 Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S.
437 (1955).
5 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §185. The complete text of §30l(a) reads as
follows: "Suits for violation of contracts ,between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
The second sentence of §30l(b) reads as follows: "Any such labor organization may
sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the
courts of .the United States."
6 See note 10 infra.
7 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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When section 301 of Taft-Hartley was passed in 1947, nobody
took it very seriously. The Westinghouse decision in 1955 certainly
gave it little scope. But in the Lincoln Mills case it became of crucial importance. Section 30l(a) is certainly innocent sounding.
"Suits for violation of contracts . . . may be brought in any district court ... ," it says, not even using the term "collective agreement." As long as the industry involved affects commerce, the
amount in controversy is immaterial and diversity of citizenship is
unnecessary.
No wonder Justice Frankfurter believes (I) that it only provides a federal forum to pursue claims under state law and (2)
that in view of Article III of the Constitution, it has not even such
limited effect. 8 If it had wanted to, he observed, Congress could
have enacted rules governing the enforcement of collective agreements. He thought Congress realized that this delicate matter
of enforcement was best left to be worked out by employers and
unions themselves. Of course this was speculation. Congress presumably could read Article III of the Constitution. It is therefore
possible that it did not intend what Justice Frankfurter indicated.
Instead it may have created in section 301 a substantive federal
law for the enforcement of collective agreements. Justice Frankfurter offers only one alternative: that section 30 I merely gave
procedural directions to federal courts concerning the appearance
of unincorporated unions otherwise eligible to appear before
them as parties and contained no substantive law of contracts. 9
My o,m opinion is that Congress was not entirely sure what it
meant in section 301 or what its constitutional powers were. Maybe it was just trying to get no-strike clauses enforced. Justice
Frankfurter's guess is probably as good as anybody's and better
than most. But in 1955 many good lawyers felt that the Court
should have read section 30l(a) as making every collective agreement in commerce enforceable at the instance of either party to
it. That is what Justices Black and Douglas thought the law
should be. And they were not concerned about any distinction be-

8 This is the net conclusion I draw from his dissent in the Lincoln Mills case, note
7 supra, at 460-485.
9 See Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348
U.S. 437 at 443, 447, 449, and Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 at 461-462, 478 (1957).
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tween union rights as such and the uniquely personal rights of
employees.10
Just what "the law" governing collective agreements was
after the Westinghouse case is not clear. If Justice Frankfurter
was right, it was state law, either common or statute. And it could
be applied in federal courts only under Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 11 with diversity jurisdiction. As he said, section 301
was not meant to shift to the federal courts a flood of grievances
better left to state courts, unless there was diversity. Later, under
Lincoln Mills, he dispelled any prior implication that a union
might ever sue alone under section 301 to enforce even a collective
right. But events proved that most of his colleagues felt other- wise, even if they had been uncertain in 1955.
Sparking off the second round, Judge Magruder said the
Westinghouse case meant that a union could sue under section
301 for breach of a collective right secured to it by an agreement.
That was in the General Electric case.12 He found the required
substantive law in the federal arbitration act. But Justice Frankfurter disowned this version of his Westinghouse opinion.13 And
Justice Douglas also refused to endorse Magruder's position.14 He
found that section 301 provided its own steam and that the arbitration act was not involved. Justice Frankfurter had said that
the federal arbitration act by its own terms did not apply to
"collective-bargaining agreements." 15 This observation, as made,
was plainly not correct; but whether or not the act so applied
was a matter of controversy. Maybe that is what dissuaded Justice

10 Those justices in the Westinghouse case who either did not understand Justice
Frankfurter's reasoning or refused to accept it, yet who agreed with him that the union
must be denied recovery, conceived what I regard as the specious notion of "uniquely
personal rights" of employees under a collective agreement in order to rationalize their
concurrence. Their subsequent inconsistency in this regard, when they voted with the
majority in the Lincoln Mills case, is neatly illustrated in Bunn, "Lincoln Mills and the
Jurisdiction To Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements," 43 VA. L. REv. 1247 at 12481251 (1953)~
11304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12 Local 205 (UE) v. General Electric Co., (1st Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 85.
13 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 at 468-469 (1957).
14 Id. at 450-451, 456-457, 458.
15 In his dissent in the Lincoln Mills case, id. at 467-468, he said, in part, while
sarcastically commenting on Justice Douglas' rationale: "I would add that the Court, in
thus deriving power from the unrevealing words of the Taft-Hartley Act, has also found
that Congress 'by implication' repealed its own statutory exemption of collective-bargaining agreements in the Arbitration Act, an exemption made as we have seen for welldefined reasons of policy." (Italics supplied.)
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Douglas from using this statute. It seems more probable that
he did not want to narrow the application of section 301 by
, confining it to the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. Also,
he may have disliked the strait-jacket of legislation, preferring
to leave the courts free to experiment.
Justice Douglas wrote the dissent in Westinghouse; and he
wrote the majority opinion in Lincoln Mills. But this does not
mean that Westinghouse is overruled.16 Nevertheless, the law in
this field is probably what Justice Douglas thinks it should be. He
clearly believes that suits by unions under section 30 I to enforce
promises in these collective agreements are actions arising under
the laws of the United States. Such "laws" apparently are (I) various parts of the LMRA of 1947, (2) section 30l(a) itself, and (3)
whatever common law the federal courts either appropriate or
evolve. It is immaterial that such common law is adapted from
other federal statutes, copied directly from state common law, or
made up off the cuff. It will all be federal substantive law in the
end. Section 30l(a) is deemed to be constitutional, even if it is
construed only as an order to the federal courts. That order is to
fashion a law of collective agreements, using fragments of federal
labor acts as the warp and state common law, together with "judicial inventiveness" 17 as the weft.
Douglas assigned this task to the federal judiciary. But Justice
Frankfurter is probably correct in saying that the whole matter is
really the job of Congress. Congress had shaped the policies giving
unions exclusive control over modern collective bargaining; and it
had left the resulting agreements themselves in a sad state of ambiguity. Had Congress attempted to remedy this defect in section
301? My guess is "No." I think it was merely seeking a way to hold
unions accountable under no-strike clauses. In 1947 a sophisticated
set of rules was thought necessary for the enforcement of collective
agreements. Assume that the members of Congress were then
aware of the need for such rules. Would they confess their own ignorance and inability to supply these rules and pass section 301

16 Id. at 456, n. 6.
17 This concept-"judicial

inventiveness"-seems to have ,been the chief ingredient of
Justice Douglas' hope for the future through the use of §301. For a brief discussion o!
how Justice Douglas exposed ;himself to the scathing comments of Justice Frankfurter,
see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW, 2d rev. ed., 471-472 (1958).
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empowering the federal courts to evolve them? We know that
members of our highest court were familiar with the dreadful
common law for enforcing collective agreements; 18 and we can
guess that they thought that Congress would never act. It seems
easier to believe that they concluded it was up to them to use section 30l(a) as an excuse to build up a few simple but effective
rules enforcing promises made in collective agreements. Anyway,
that is where we stand now. And the real question is: what kind
of law of the collective agreement should the federal courts make?
In its interpretation of section 30l(a) the Supreme Court has
run true to form. Before 1937 it kept federal power and jurisdiction narrow; but it tolerated a fairly broad conception of a federal
common law in diversity cases. Then in 1937 it drastically increased congressional power under the commerce clause. With
pre-emption by implication, this left precious little to the states
where Congress acted at all. As if to ease its conscience, the Court
next required that federal judges apply the controlling state law
in diversity cases.19 Now it appears that under section 301 this
trend is somewhat reversed. This new move is not an expansion of
congressional power. Indeed, the Court actually calls it an exercise by Congress of existing power. Nor is it really a reversal of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 2° For it has no relation to diversity jurisdiction; and it does not even pretend to be a venture
into a federal common law. The Court treats section 301 virtually
as a delegation by Congress to the federal courts of its legislative
power to develop a detailed body of law governing collective agreements made in commerce. To me such judge-made law seems like
common law. But why worry about what it is called? Evolving under the protective scrutiny of a majority of the Supreme Court, it
will still be the law-and constitutional, at that!

18See Justice Jackson's opinion in J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). His
discussion intimates that the Court must <have been somewhat aware of the state of the
common law. Occasional observations in the Westinghouse and Lincoln Mills cases also
indicate that members of the Court knew enough about these common-law rules to have
a pretty dismal view of them.
•
19 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20 But for an exceedingly interesting expression of opinion on this, see Hanslowe,
"Section 301 of Taft-Hartley and the Brooding Omnipresence of William Winslow
Grosskey," 35 UNIV. DETROIT L. J. 201 (1957). Compare the article of Chief Judge Charles
E. Clark, "Professor Crosskey and the Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins," 21
UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 24 (1953).
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Justice Douglas did not offer much explanatory legal theory.
He saw where he wanted to go and knew he would get there if he
could get the votes of four of his colleagues, regardless of what
slogans they used. But however dubious we may think his tech. nique, we cannot shrug off scholars like Professor Bunn who believe that Congress really intended in section 30l(a) what the
Court has read into it.21 After all, we must remember Zechariah
Chafee's magnificent story about Browning, as told by Professors
Bickel and Wellington.22 When taxed with a plausible version of
one of his early obscure works, the poet said: "I didn't mean that
when I wrote it, but I mean it now."
Justice Frankfurter may have been right about Congress and
section 301 in 1947.23 But that is water over the dam. With the
1958 version of section 301, the future of the law of collective
agreements seems very bright.24 We might have had a patchwork of
state law or a political compromise by Congress, perhaps full of
rigid provisions. Now we can proceed with the experimental evolutionary process between employers and unions as the basis of the
law. Not that the Supreme Court plans to let the parties write
their own ticket altogether. But it will treat them as informal
friends of the court in shaping the new code of rules. Had Congress
simply amended the federal arbitration act to cover collective
agreements or adopted the new uniform arbitration act, the job of
enforcement might thus have been left to labor arbitrators. But
the Court apparently thought the likelihood of Congress doing this
was too much of a gamble. As it is, federal judges lacking expertise
in the field may produce some weird law. But the Supreme Court
will presumably always be there to straighten things out.
Several Supreme Court justices indicate that neither the union

21 See Bunn, "Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction To Enforce Collective Bargaining
Agreements," 43 VA. L. R.Ev. 1247 (1953).
22 "Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case," 71 HARv.
L. R.Ev. 1 at 15-16 (1957).
23 Personally I think he was correct about the scope and meaning of §301(a) and (b).
As to the constitutional issue involved, however, I have no very strong feelings except
to note that the "learning'' in this area seems confused and full of meaningless words
and concepts.
24 This opinion is by no means unanimous. See the pessimistic view expressed in
Feinsinger, "Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining,"
43 VA. L. REv. 126 (1957).

642

MICHIGAN

LA.w

REVIEW

[ Vol. 57

nor any individual employee may maintain an action under section
301 to enforce any provision establishing a term or condition of
work automatically incorporated into individual employment contracts. They deem enforceable, against employers, only promises
made for the benefit of the union-specifically, in Lincoln Mills,
a promise to arbitrate an unsettled grievance arising under the
contract. But this is confusing. Most arbitrated grievances concern the so-called "uniquely personal rights"25 of employees arising under provisions of the agreement that deal with terms and
conditions of employment. Thus the Court has allowed indirectly
in Lincoln Mills what it denied in Westinghouse. 26 If it has in effect overruled the older case, we should be told about it!
Now that the federal courts must resort to judicial inventiveness,27 we can all come forth with suggestions. In a situation like
Westinghouse, where there is no arbitration clause, I hope the
federal judges make it plain that all of the provisions of a collective agreement in commerce will be enforced, whether or not they
establish individual terms and conditions of employment. In such
a case I suppose we should argue that suit may be brought either
by one or more employees or by the union in their behalf. Section
30l(b) and the federal rules suggest the latter as possible.28 While
I thought otherwise last year,29 I now believe that nothing in section 301 prevents individual employees from suii:'ig.29a But at this
point I think the federal judges should firmly assert their new
law-making power. I think they should flatly refuse to allow actions under section 301 by individual employees against employ-

25 See

note 10 supra.
Bunn,. "Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction To Enforce Collective Bargaining
Agreements," 43 VA. L. REv. 1247 (1953).
27 See note 17 supra. Surely federal judges, including members of the Supreme Court,
have no monopoly on inventiveness. I do not see why arbitral, or even professorial,
inventiveness cannot •be given scope here, as long as the Supreme Court ihas the last
word-which it always does, anyivay, whatever happens or whoever invents!
28 For the appropriate provision in §30l(b), see note 5 supra. See also Rule 17(a)
of -the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. And see Bunn, "Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction To Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements," 43 VA. L. REv. 1247 at 1258 (1953).
29 GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW, 2d rev. ed., 464 (1958).
29a In a talk before the Cleveland Bar Association on February 28, 1959, I returned
to ,the position that individual employees will probably not be allowed to sue under §301
because that measure provides for suits "for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization," whereas individual workers sue only on their personal contracts
of employment.
26 See
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ers, whether or not there is an arbitration clause. Indeed, where arbitration is provided, the courts should refuse to enforce any provision at all that could be arbitrated. Here they should confine
their attention to enforcement of the arbitration clause itself, except for their function in proceedings to enforce awards, to be
discussed later. Where there is no arbitration clause, the union
should decide whether or not suit should be brought on behalf
of one or more employees. And the union should be left to maintain and finance such actions, with complete control of the litigation and its settlement throughout. This is consistent with the policy of the LMRA making the union exclusive bargaining agency
in the first place.30 And the Burley case31 showed what a mess
accompanies the momentary relaxation of this majority rule
principle.
As a corollary, individual employees should be denied any
personal recourse against an employer on a claim arising from a
collective agreement in interstate commerce. This may seem harsh.
But it coincides with the policy originally enacted by Congress
with respect to establishing terms and conditions of employment.
I can still imagine actions by individual employees involving simple issues of fact-matters not involving contract interpretations,
such as, "Did the timekeeper add correctly, or who worked how
long on a certain day?" Maybe individual employees should be
allowed to litigate any claims they might raise directly as grievances
under the section 9(a) proviso.32 But I think this would be
impractical.
The distinction made between the uniquely personal rights of

30 That is, under §9(a) of the LMRA a union acting as ,bargaining representative
for a bargaining unit is exclusive representative of all members of the unit, whether or
not they belong to the union. This is sometimes called the "majority rule" principle.
See Jackson, J., in J. I. Case Co. v. NDRB, 321 U.S. 332 at 339 (1944), where he said in
passing: "The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more than that
of the group, to vote against representation; but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes
the employment bargain, individual advantages or favor will generally in practice go in
as a contribution to the collective result." (Italics supplied.) See, also, Weyand, "Majority
Rule in Collective Bargaining," 45 CoL. L. R.Ev. 556 (1945).
31 Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), affd. and "modified" on rehearing 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
32 In the 1947 version, of course, the original proviso is expanded and another added.
In effect, the individual employee is allowed to file and prosecute his own grievances
directly, with the union standing by to see that the contract provisions are in no way
jeopardized.
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employees and the rights of unions, as such, although specious,83
is not too disturbing. Indeed, if there is an arbitration clause, the
practical result of this distinction is fine. That is, no provision of a
collective agreement dealing with terms and conditions of employment shall be litigated in a federal court. Rather, these matters
will be left for arbitrators to handle. Arbitrators are chosen by the
parties; and they are presumably conversant with collective agreements and are experienced in comprehending them. They understand the industrial context in which such agreements are fashioned. Moreover, they are familiar with the concepts, phraseology
and even ellipsis so common in documents drafted by men not
accustomed to using words. They can make sense in applying
fairly broad principles to a host of detailed situations which could
be neither explicitly anticipated nor covered in the agreement.34
Why trust a busy federal judge with this sort of thing any more
than a skilled arbitrator with a district judge's job? Anyhow, federal judges would be swamped by this work.
Suppose either party to a collective agreement refuses to agree
to an arbitration clause. The courts cannot make th.em arbitrate.
I think this might possibly be held a refusal to bargain. But perhaps Congress should amend the labor act to require that all collective agreements in commerce must include grievance procedures with arbitration as the last step. If Congress or the Board did
nothing about this, the federal courts might devise a negative
sanction forcing parties to accept arbitration. Thus they could
refuse to enforce their agreements judicially, leaving them exposed
to mutual direct action such as strikes. However achieved, recourse
only to arbitration would enable a uniform procedure for the
enforcement of collective agreements. Those who think of arbitration as purely consensual might be shocked by some of these
ideas. But such notions would leave it just as consensual as anything else in this area today. 35

33 See

34 See

note 10 supra.
Shulman, "Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations," 68

HARV. L. REv.
999 (1955).
35 Reference is made to §8(5) and 8(a){5) matters. It is pretty clear that many employers have to ",bargain" about and include in contracts -many items which they would
vastly prefer to fight out.
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With universal grievance arbitration, the federal courts would
no longer interpret and apply the provisions of collective agreements. Their main function would be to order compliance with
agreements to arbitrate and later to pass on actions brought to enforce awards. We must, therefore, consider the effect of the NorrisLaGuardia Act in this field. I have for many years thought that it
has nothing to do with the enforcement of contract provisions.36
Breach of a collective agreement, as such, is clearly not a section
13 labor dispute. Nor is it section 4 conduct to which the antiinjunction strictures attach. Conduct constituting the breach of a
no-strike clause, I admit, appears to fall within both sections 4 a~d
13.37 But even here the Supreme Court should make it clear that
no-strike provisions are specifically enforceable. Justice Douglas
showed in the Lincoln Mills case that the equitable enforcement
of collective agreements in general is beyond the reach of NorrisLaGuardia. Last year in the Chicago River case38 the Court held
that recourse to direct strike action by a union is enjoinable where
Congress had provided an alternative method for handling grievances. The Railway Labor Act has no special provision relaxing
the anti-injunction law. I think a contract provision for arbitration, whether or not there is a no-strike clause, might be held as
analogous to the congressional provision for handling grievances
in that situation. There is a strong federal policy to promote the
making of collective agreements and to require compliance with
them. Pursuant to this policy, I think the courts should enjoin
strikes to enforce grievances even in the absence of no-strike
pledges.39 The Chicago River case certainly suggests this result.

36 See

Gregory, "The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope," 1949

WASH. UNIV. L. REv. 3.
37 This is a generous concession on my part, in view of the state of the law. See
A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. Seafarers' Intl. Union, (2d Cir. 1957) 250 F. (2d) 326, cert.
den. 355 U.S. 932 (1958). But Professor Cox apparently takes the same view. See Cox,
"The Law of Grievance Arbitration," 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 247 at 252-256 (1958).
38 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S.
30 (1957).
39 Part of the instructions given in the Lincoln Mills case to the lower federal courts
was to further the prevailing basic policies in our national labor laws. Surely one of the
most basic of these policies is to promote the making of collective agreements and to
inculcate a certain amount of respect for them, when made. I would also suppose that
part of a federal judge's job under the Lincoln Mills doctrine is to keep abreast of what
is happening in our times. After all, 1932 was a long time ago and conditions have
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The same underlying policy in our labor laws might also be
used to counteract Norris-LaGuardia even where unions call bargaining strikes in violation of no-strike pledges. As part of their
new job, the federal courts might even declare the following: once
an agreement is signed, the use of direct action in bargaining over
new issues is foreclosed during the life of the contract. Can the enforcement of no-strike clauses be left to arbitrators under contracts? Many of us arbitrators have in a sense enforced no-strike
pledges by sustaining discipline imposed by employers on
employees who provoke such violations. Under a grievance brought
by an employer, why couldn't an arbitrator effectively award that
a union cease and desist from striking? Many question the power
of an arbitrator to issue such orders under any circumstance. But
the New York Court of Appeals recently recognized that it is
possible.40 After all, an arbitrator's powers are what the parties give
him in the agreement.
In their new task the federal courts cannot afford to worry
about such things as technical consideration or mutuality of obligation and the statute of frauds. 41 Holding that promises to arbitrate future disputes are enforceable without legislation, the Supreme Court has already dealt with the most important matter.42
It might have been simpler here to use the federal arbitration act.48

changed drastically. Judges who still confuse violations of collective agreements with
§13 labor disputes and §4 conduct have, in my opinion, lost contact with reality. The
passage of time has operated as a function of many other types of judicial output at
the ihighest level. I do not see why it should not do so in this instance, as well.
40 Matter of Ruppert (Ruppert v. Egelhofer), 2 Misc. (2d) 744, 152 N.Y.S. (2d) 327
(1956), affd. and mod. 2 App. Div. (2d) 670, 153 N.Y.S. (2d) 553 (1956), 3 N.Y. (2d) 576,
170 N.Y.S. (2d) 785, 148 N.E. (2d) 129 (1958).
41A court that can brush aside ,the common-law rule against enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes surely would not let these trivia be bothersome!
Anyway, it is established policy (no doubt suitable for purposes of the Lincoln Mills
doctrine) that agreements do not -have to be signed to be enforceable-at least in §8
cases, if not always in §9 proceedings. And if it were not, then it is established policy
that the Board and Court will compel the employer to sign. See H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 514 (1941).
42 See note 41 supra. See also Magruder, C.J., in Local 205 (UE) v. General Electric
Co., (1st Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 85 at 95-96. Also Gregory and Orlikoff, "The Enforcement
of Labor Arbitration Agreements," 17 UNIV. Cm. L. REV. 233 (1950).
43 That is what Chief Judge Magruder wanted to do in the General Electric case
note 42 supra. He there worked out an exceedingly convincing argnment with which
several other federal judges have agreed in the past. But this way out of the dilemma
now seems utterly academic.
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But the Court's failure to do so may imply that it does not want to
be bothered with the other provisions of that statute. This may also
be a hint that the federal courts should not clutter up labor arbitration with a lot of formalities comparable to those in law suits.
Instances are the form and substance of the submission agreement and other "pleadings," the manner of hearing and presentation of cases, rules of evidence, formalities governing awards and
opinions, etc. Requirements of this sort would change the whole
character of labor arbitration. They might stifle any chance it has
of developing through the evolutionary process. This is why I
believe the Supreme Court is side-stepping legislation of any kind.
Are the federal courts going to pass in advance on the arbitrability of issues raised? Will they decide ahead of time whether the
arbitrator has jurisdiction or power to pass on certain matters?
Should they conclude that on facts alleged by unions, nobody
could possibly read the contract clause in question to mean what
the union says it means? And conceding the union's case on the
merits, will they declare that the union must nevertheless lose because of its non-compliance with certain contract limitation requirements such as time for filing, failure reasonably to pursue
steps toward arbitration, etc.? Here is where the whole future of
labor contract enforcement hangs in the balance.44 In proceedings
by a union to require arbitration, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit has already held that it may read the contract to determine whether or not the grievance arose under it. Holding that
it did not so arise, the court dismissed the union's case.45 And recently the same court denied a union's request for enforcement of
a promise to arbitrate because, in its opinion, an unreasonable
time had elapsed between appointment of the partisan arbi-

44 At this point reference is made to the splendid writing of Professor Cox, cited
note 1 supra. Special attention is drawn to his discussion of the Cutler-Hammer doctrine
[Local 402, Intl. Assn. of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.
(2d) 317 (1957), affd. 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. (2d) 464 (1947)] and related matters in "Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration," 30 ROCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 247 at 258
et seq. (1958).
45 Local 149, AF of TE v. General Electric Co., (1st Cir. 1957) 250 F. (2d) 922. Chief
Judge Magruder, after his brilliant opinion in the General Electric-Local 205 case [233
F. (2d) 85], which promised such enlightened leadership from him for the federal bench
under the Lincoln Mills doctrine, now appears not to have understood Justice Douglas'
signals in that case. At least, if he did, he is certainly fumbling the ball.
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trators and recourse by the union to the American Arbitration
Association.46
I hope that the Supreme Court insists that such preliminary
matters be left in the first instance (if not finally) for the arbitrator to decide. Of course, the parties may provide in their contract
that arbitrability shall be subject to the preliminary ruling of a
court, just as I suppose they may agree never to have a court pass
on that matter. But if the courts pass on these issues at all, they
should do so only when they are asked to enforce awards allowing
grievances.47 I assume no court would overrule an arbitrator who
dismisses a grievance because he thinks that he has no jurisdiction
or that the issue is not arbitrable, any more than if he dismisses it
on the merits. A possible exception to this might well be when the
arbitrator was proved to have been corrupt. And if an arbitrator
dismisses a grievance on the merits, regardless of how stupid he
may seem to have been, the court should hold that there is nothing
for it to review. 48 Of course, if the arbitrator was shown to

46 Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' International Union (AFL-CIO),
(1st Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 516, reversing (D.C. Mass. 1958) 161 F. Supp. 222. Here,
Magruder's court, reversed District Judge Wyzanski. From the side-lines it would appear
that Wyzanski would make a better quarterback on the Lincoln Mills team than Magruder
would. At least, he seems willing to subordinate the role of the judge and to leave as
much as possible .to be done by arbitrators. With different rulings from other circuits on
some of these points, perhaps the Supreme Court can be induced to promulgate some
of the rules.
47 Naturally I do not argue that courts no longer have any place at all in the enforcement of collective agreements. But I really believe it would be best if they had practically
nothing to do with it. Obviously, when -they are called upon to enforce agreements to
arbitrate, they must ascertain whether such an agreement exists at all. But I strongly
feel that the question of arbitrability of issues under a contract containing an agreement
to arbitrate should be left completely to the arbitrator. Actually I would consider any
reasonable compromise here, as long as courts passed on this issue only in proceedings
for the enforcement of an award and did not then presume to interpret contract provisions dealing with terms and conditions of employment in their efforts to determine
whether or not an issue was arbitrable.
At the presentation of this paper it was clear from the discussion of it by Mr. George
B. Christensen of -the Chicago Bar that he was shocked .by my position. In spite of his
remarks and though I acknowledge that he is exceedingly able and a brilliant lawyer
in the field of labor relations, I am of the same opinion still. I cannot see why a federal
judge's reading of a collective agreement, or any part of it, should ·be a whit ·better than
the reading by an ax,bitrator selected by the parties-or anywhere nearly as good, if the
arbitrator is worth his salt. If the arbitrator is incompetent, he can -be dismissed; but
we are stuck for life with incompetent federal judges. This argument, however, could
go on endlessly. Obviously the difference between us is one of basic faith in one system
or another in a particular context.
48 This proposition is overstated deliberately; but I mean every word of it. It is
amazing how much the parties can "take" and how much they can learn from the
mistakes of an incompetent arbitrator.
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have been bribed, a hearing before a new arbitrator would be
appropriate.
Arbitrators are accustomed to pass on their own power or jurisdiction to act after it has been challenged. On the whole, I believe this works very well. I think it bad to have a judge pass in
advance on the arbitrator's jurisdiction or power to act in a particular case or at any time on the arbitrability of an issue where
his decision depends on interpreting a contract provision setting
terms of employment.49 This worries me almost as much as having
a court review the merits of an award and reinterpret the contract
or re-assess the testimony to see if the arbitrator's disposition was
''sound.'' I think federal courts should never undertake to review
the merits of an arbitration case, with respect either to the meaning of contract provisions or the weight of the evidence as a basis
for findings of fact, regardless of the state of the record. Courts
have already been doing these things. And they will continue to do
so unless stopped. I suppose the courts would honor a contract provision leaving all questions of jurisdiction and power or arbitrability to the arbitrator alone.50 Possibly that is what the parties
have always meant when they say the arbitrator's decision shall be
final and binding. Anyway, the least the federal courts can do is to
leave all preliminary issues to the arbitrator and never intercede
(aside from enforcing promises to arbitrate) except in proceedings
to enforce an award.
If arbitration were imposed by the NLRB or Congress, due
process might require some review of evidence and findings as
with administrative boards.51 But even then the arbitrator's interpretation of contract provisions dealing with terms of employment
should be final. What should happen where the parties consent to
arbitrate but cannot agree on an arbitrator? Surely judicial inventiveness would warrant direct appointment of one by the judge or
his delegation of such task to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or the American Arbitration Association.52 It seems

49 See note 47 supra.
50 Professor Cox also

holds this view. See Cox, "Current Problems in the Law of
Grievance Arbitration," 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 247 at 259 (1958).
51 This concession is made only to avoid constitutional difficulties.
52 If judicial inventiveness can supply the power equitably to enforce agreements to
arbitrate, in spite of the common-law ruling to the contrary, surely it could achieve this.
Maybe we will all have to readjust our thinking about what federal judges can or cannot
do, in light of the Lincoln Mills doctrine. Apparently, from now on, all the judges have
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. imperative that federal judges confine themselves to promoting
and protecting the arbitration process itself, always deferring to
the more liberal rules appearing in contract arbitration clauses.
Thus arbitrators will be left free to interpret and apply contracts
as the parties intended.53
There are many existing rules governing arbitration-some in
statutes-that the federal courts may adopt. But novel issues will
arise. May an arbitrator issue cease and desist orders? Does it make
any difference if the case touches upon federal laws, as with enforcement of a "no-discrimination" clause? May an arbitrator ever
be allowed to interpret state or federal law in a case before him?
Lots of us have done so and I can see nothing wrong about it. For
instance, an arbitrator cannot dismiss a grievance in a discharge
case just because the employer was guilty of illegal discrimination
under the LMRA.
Where a contract provides arbitration as a last step in a grievance procedure, the federal courts should compel initial recourse
to this process. They should enjoin actions at law to enforce agreements. This defers to the method legislated by the parties. And it
acknowledges the majority rule principle underlying the whole
bargaining process. This may be at war with the section 9(a)
proviso. But that clause speaks only of "adjustment" by individuals and seems inconsistent with the act's basic policies. Presumably unions will have complete discretion in prosecuting grievances to arbitration, whether or not to settle them at any time and
on what terms, or to drop them altogether. And where an arbitrator has rendered a favorable award, only the union should be allowed to seek its enforcement, although North Carolina holds
otherwise.54 One court has held that an agreement to arbitrate a
term of a new contract is different from an agreement to arbitrate
future grievances under a contract and is not enforceable. 115 That

to do in order to surmount new difficulties is just to go ahead and surmount them! It
is possible, of course, that I misunderstand the Lincoln Mills doctrine. It is equally
possible that all this power derives directly from §30l(a) instead of from judicial
inventiveness.
53See Shulman, "Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations," 68 HARv. L. REv.
999 (1955).
114 Lamonde v. Oleo Mfg. Co., 243 N.C. 749, 92 S.E. (2d) 143 (1956).
1111 Boston Printing Pressmen's Union No. 67 v. Potter Press, (1st Cir. 1957) 241 F. (2d)
787.
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unfortunate result seems inconsistent with the policy of our labor
laws favoring the peaceful settlement of disputes.
I hope the courts will help this delicate arbitration process to
develop as a means of implementing the collective agreement. I
hope they will give scope to the homely and frequently non-professional notions of the parties who negotiate the agreements and
will accept the aid of arbitrators selected by the parties. I trust
that they will leave the parties free to write their own rules for
living together, including the right to decide how such rules will
be interpreted and applied.
There remains the problem of pre-emption. As with protected
activities and unfair practices under the LMRA, federal pre-emption in this field circumscribes the freedom of state courts to act.
But in this area things are a lot different from what is involved in
the Garn:er5 6 and Weber5 1 cases. Here at first it was thought that
state law and state courts would hold complete sway-that federal
courts would act only in diversity cases. Now the turn-about has
come full swing. In the name of section 301 the Supreme Court
has put the federal courts in the saddle and federal law in control.
Can the state courts now play any part at all? And if so, to what
extent? Judge Traynor of California is probably correct in the
McCarroll case58 in saying: "Yes." The (to me) incomprehensible
Garner and Weber cases at least indicate that state courts and
agencies cannot impose local law in dealing with matters covered
by the federal act. 59 They cannot apply even the federal law, except under cession agreements.
Although initiated by Congress in section 301, what the law
governing collective agreements turns out to be is entirely in the
hands of the federal courts. Judge Traynor aptly remarks that
nothing in section 30 I or any other federal law says or even implies
that the state courts may not participate with the federal courts in
the enforcement of collective agreements made in interstate com-

56 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
57 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 469 (1955).
58 Mccarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of

Carpenters, 49 Cal. (2d) 45,
315 P. (2d) 322 (1957).
59 I really mean that the Garner case is incomprehensible to me. Furthermore, I
think the members of the Court themselves are confused and do not understand just
what they are doing in this .field of federal pre-emption by implication. See GREGORY,
LABOR AND THE LAw, 2d rev. ed., 530 et seq. (1958).
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merce. He admits-as he should-that state courts will have to
apply federal substantive law. But (as he observes) so far nobody
knows what that law is or will be. Presumably it will resemble
ih spots the existing state law. Whatever it may be like, it should
adhere to the majority rule principle. And in dealing with cases
arising in interstate commerce, state courts will have to abandon
their traditional dislike of enforcing collective agreements and the
promises in them and will probably cease allowing actions by individual employees and permit unions to contract, sue and be sued.
Judge Traynor says it will make a difference whether or not
the conduct amounting to breach of a collective agreement is at the
same time protected activity or an unfair labor practice under federal law. I do not agree, although this aspect of pre-emption by implication has not yet arisen. I think the federal courts will enforce
collective agreements where the conduct amounting to the breach
is either protected or unfair under the labor act. And I feel sure
that the Supreme Court will let the state courts do likewise. Of
course, nobody yet knows for sure that the Supreme Court will
recognize coordinate jurisdiction in state and federal courts. But it
is free to rule either way; and nothing in section 301 can prevent
the Court from letting the state courts share the job of contract
enforcement purely on federal terms. It might resemble practice
under the Federal Employers Liability Act, with ultimate appellate control in the Supreme Court.
This plan should work easily. But already an amusing refinement of this coordinate jurisdiction has occurred. California's
Judge Traynor recognized the Bull Line case60 as prevailing federal law. And in the McCarroll case61 he observed that there was no
such restraint as the Norris-LaGuardia Act on judges in his state.
Hence his court upheld an injunction enforcing a no-strike pledge.
He said that this was not a difference of substantive law but,
rather, of remedy. Now it is important that only one law and one
scheme govern in the enforcement of collective agreements made
in the federal arena. That is to prevent "forum shopping" by
parties looking for a break under one set of rules or another. To

60 (2d Cir. 1957) 250 F. (2d) 326, in the Mccarroll case, 49 Cal. (2d) 45, 215 P. (2d)
322 (1957).
61 Note 60 supra.
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promote this policy the law must achieve the same results in both
sets of courts, whether we call it substantive or remedial.62
Dean Pirsig of Minnesota wistfully hopes that Congress will
adopt the uniform arbitration act with a provision that federal and
state courts will exercise coordinate jurisdiction thereunder to enforce collective agreements made in commerce-analogous to what
goes on under the FELA. 63 This seems like a good idea. But Congress is not likely to pass such a statute. Meanwhile, the federal
courts should lose no time in judicially legislating their own program, using section 30 I as a jumping-off place. The Supreme
Court may wish to forestall the possibility of legislation. It seems
to prefer leaving the whole matter up to controlled experimentation between the parties to collective agreements and the courts.
Dean Pirsig's analogy to the FELA will no doubt occur. But there
will not be a federal statute governing the law of collective agreements and administration under them. Rather there will probably
be a body of what we might call federal "common law" adjunct
to section 301, which will supersede in the state courts all local
state common or statute law.
This whole thing is a unique legal situation. We are dealing
with a novel subject-matter-the collective agreement64-which is
supposed to be what the parties themselves make it. At the same
time we are trying to foster a new kind of social structure-selfgovernment in an industrial society. On top of this we recognize
the need of some neutral procedure to enforce collective agreements and settle differences arising under them. But we do not
want to restrict the parties at all in their experimentation. What

62 When this paper was read, Professor Wellington of Yale, one of the discussants,
adversely criticized my position as it is stated here. He thought Judge Traynor was
correct and that I was completely wrong. I remain absolutely unconvinced by my critics.
Professor Wellington knows a great deal more than I do about federal jurisdiction and
the intricacies of pre-emption, etc. But I still ,believe that coordinate jurisdiction of state
and federal courts administering the same law will be impractical if you have two
possible competing results. I cannot believe that there is any magic in the terms remedial
and substantive.
63 Pirsig, "The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the Lincoln Mills Case,"
42 MINN. L. REV. 333 (1958).
64 See Witmer, "Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts,'' 48 YALE L. J. 195 (1938),
and Cox, "The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements,'' 57 MICH. L. R.Ev. I
(1958). At this point so much of what the late Harry Shulman said seems apropos. See
his article, "Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations," 68 HARv. L. REv. 999 (1955).
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better or more unique answer to this need could be imagined than
the roving commission the Supreme Court has assumed for itself
and the lower federal courts? In a fluid quasi-legislative fashion
they may conduct experiments in this field and can produce something eventually that is bound to be revolutionary-and no doubt
a triumph-in law-making.

